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I. INTRODUCTION  
During the final stages of its nearly three-decades-long civil 
war in 2009, Sri Lanka attracted considerable international 
attention due to the allegations of international crimes that were 
said to have been committed both by the Sri Lankan government 
Armed Forces, the Guerilla Force, and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  According to United Nations (UN) 
experts, an estimated 40,000 civilians were killed during the 
final offensive, which lasted from January to May 2009.1  
However, the Sri Lankan government has set this figure at 9,000 
with no civilian casualties.2  Several UN bodies found credible 
allegations that international crimes were committed by both 
parties taking part in the civil war, some of which amounted to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.3  Further allegations 
of international crimes being committed by Sri Lankan 
government forces surfaced in two documentaries by Channel 4 
(UK) that claimed to include video footage from the final phases 
of the civil war.4 
Since the end of the civil war, multiple national and 
international actors repeatedly called for conducting 
transparent and impartial investigations and prosecutions, 
albeit with no success.5  Recently, the conflict once again 
 
1 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, ¶ 137 (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter 
UNSG Experts Accountability Rep.]. 
2 Id. ¶¶ 2, 195; Charles Haviland, Sri Lanka government publishes war 
death toll statistics, BBC (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
17156686.  
3 See Rep. of the OHCHR Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL), Human 
Rights Council on Its Thirtieth Session, ¶¶ 5–6, 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/CRP.2 
(Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter OISL Rep.]; UNSG Experts Accountability Rep., 
supra note 1, at ii–iv. Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions included unlawful killings, torture, sexual and gender-based 
violence, hostilities on civilians and civilian objects, abductions and forced 
recruitment, etc. OISL Rep., supra note 3, ¶¶ 1113–74. 
4 See Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields, CHANNEL 4 (June 14, 2011), 
https://www.channel4.com/programmes/sri-lankas-killing-fields; Sri Lanka’s 
Killing Fields: War Crimes Unpunished, CHANNEL 4 (Mar. 14, 2012), 
https://www.channel4.com/programmes/sri-lankas-killing-fields/on-
demand/52949-001. 
5 War Crimes in Sri Lanka, INT’L CRISIS GRP. (May 17, 2010), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/war-crimes-sri-lanka; 
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received a rare yet fleeting dose of attention when former U.S. 
President, Barack Obama, made reference to it in his recent 
memoir, “A Promised Land.”6  In addition, in January 2021, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle 
Bachelet, outlined “a number of options [available to UN 
member states] to advance criminal accountability and provide 
measures of redress for victims [of the conflict]” in Sri Lanka, 
specifically mentioning referring the situation to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).7  This led to the subsequent 
adoption of a resolution during the 46th session of the UN 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), where a decision was made 
“to strengthen . . . the capacity of the Office of the High 
Commissioner to collect . . . and preserve information and 
evidence and to develop possible strategies for future 
accountability processes for gross violations of human rights or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sri 
Lanka.”8 Despite this, eleven years after the end of the conflict, 
progress in terms of achieving justice and ending impunity has 
been limited.  Despite their fading hopes, victims of the alleged 
international crimes committed during the civil war and its 
aftermath and their loved ones still continue to await justice. 
Against this background, this article discusses: (1) the 
various national actions that have been initiated in Sri Lanka; 
 
Sri Lanka: UN Members Should Back Hybrid Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 
16, 2015, 5:47 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/16/sri-lanka-un-
members-should-back-hybrid-court. 
6 See Easwaran Rutnam, Obama’s book notes UN failure in Sri Lanka, 
DAILY MIRROR (Nov. 25, 2020, 12:07 AM), 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/front_page/Obama%E2%80%99s-book-notes-UN-
failure-in-Sri-Lanka/238-200524. 
7 Rep. of the OHCHR on Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and 
Human Rights in Sri Lanka, Human Rights Council on Its Forty-Sixth Session, 
Feb. 22–Mar. 19, 2021, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc A/HRC/46/20 (Jan. 27, 2021) 
[hereinafter OHCHR Advanced Unedited Rep.]. This idea was again reiterated 
in the Advanced Edited Version of the Report released in February 2021. See 
Rep. of the OHCHR on Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human 
Rights in Sri Lanka, Human Rights Council on Its Forty-Sixth Session, Feb. 
22–Mar. 19, 2021, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc A/HRC/46/20 (Feb. 9, 2021) [hereinafter 
OHCHR Advanced Edited Rep.]. 
8 Rep. of the OHCHR on Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and 
Human Rights in Sri Lanka, Human Rights Council on Its Forty-Sixth Session, 
Feb. 22–Mar. 23, 2021, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc A/HRC/46/L.1/Rev.1 (Mar. 16, 2021). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/3
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(2) the progress made with regard to the various international 
calls for justice; and (3) the possible international and partially 
international avenues for pursuing justice.  Finally, the article 
concludes by outlining the present domestic conditions in Sri 
Lanka and making recommendations on possible avenues to 
pursue in order to ensure that justice is delivered.  
II. NATIONAL ACTION 
A. National Mechanisms 
Since the end of the civil war, successive Sri Lankan 
governments have engaged in several box-ticking exercises in 
order to subdue both internal and external calls for justice.  Thus 
far, three main steps have been taken by the Sri Lankan 
government to establish an institution resembling a national 
accountability mechanism.  These steps have been: (i) the 
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC);9 (ii) the 
Consultation Task Force (CTF) on Reconciliation Mechanisms;10 
and (iii) the Office on Missing Persons (OMP).11  As outlined 
below, other mechanisms and avenues have also emerged.  
However, in the absence of any viable means through which 
victims and aggrieved communities can seek justice for the 
alleged international crimes, all these initiatives have fallen 
short of any real attempt at delivering justice and combating 
impunity.  
 
9 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON LESSON LEARNT AND 
RECONCILIATION 1–3 (2011), http://slembassyusa.org/downloads/LLRC-
REPORT.pdf [hereinafter LLRC REP.]. 
10 See generally FINAL REPORT OF THE CONSULTATION TASK FORCE ON 
RECONCILIATION MECHANISMS: VOL. I (2016), http://war-victims-map.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/CTF-Final-Report-Volume-I-Nov-16.pdf; ZONAL TASK 
FORCES, CONSOLIDATED REPORT – ZONAL TASK FORCES ON RECONCILIATION 
MECHANISMS: VOL. II (2016), http://war-victims-map.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/CTF-Final-Report-Volume-II-Nov-16.pdf. 
11 See generally Office on Missing Persons (OMP), MINISTRY NAT’L 
INTEGRATION & RECONCILIATION, 
http://nirmin.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12
7:office-on-missing-persons-omp&catid=9:projects&lang=en&Itemid=208 (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2021); About Us – Establishment of the OMP, OFF. ON MISSING 
PERS., http://www.ompsrilanka.org/about/establishment-of-the-commission 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2021). 
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1. Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) 
The HRCSL was established through the Human Rights 
Commission of Sri Lanka Act No. 21 of 1996.12  It was not 
specifically established to probe alleged international crimes 
committed during the course of the civil war.  However, its 
capability to investigate complaints related to violations and 
imminent violations of fundamental rights enshrined in the Sri 
Lankan Constitution gave it the potential to transform the 
Commission into a key player in the search for justice and 
accountability.  The Commission initiated “a special 
investigation into disappearances in Jaffna in 2003.”13  In March 
of 2006, it appointed a Special Rapporteur to investigate human 
rights violations related to the civil war, which led to the 
identification of the likely perpetrators in four murder cases 
including in the 2006 Trincomalee Five Case.14  The Special 
Rapporteur recommended further investigations into the 
incidents.  In November 2006, this resulted in the establishment 
of a separate mechanism, the Commission of Inquiry to 
Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious Violations of 
Human Rights Occurring since August 1, 2005 (a.k.a. 
Udalagama Commission).15  The Udalagama Commission was 
established through Gazette 1471/6 of 2006, to investigate 16 
cases of killings and enforced disappearances.16  This included 
the Trincomalee Five Case.17  Out of these 16 cases, the 
Udalagama Commission was only able to complete its 
investigations into seven cases.18  The Trincomalee Five Case, 
which is discussed further in a subsequent section of this article, 
later proceeded to court but experienced several setbacks over 
 
12 Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No. 21 of 1996, ¶ 2(1) 
(L.D.-O 12/94), https://www.hrcsl.lk/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/HRC-Act.pdf. 
13 OISL Rep., supra note 3, ¶ 1202. 
14 Id. ¶¶ 1202, 1208–16. The Trincomalee 5 Case revolved around the 
alleged killing of five Tamil students in Trincomalee. See Sri Lanka: No Justice 
for ‘Trinco 5’, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 8, 2019, 10:30 PM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/08/sri-lanka-no-justice-trinco-5. 
15 OISL Rep., supra note 3, ¶ 1209.  
16 Id. ¶ 1209 & n.1222. 
17 Id. at 235 n.1222. 
18 Id. ¶ 1216. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/3
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the years.19  
The HRCSL’s independence has come into question in 
recent years, especially with the passing of the 20th Amendment 
to the Constitution of Sri Lanka,20 which now means that the Sri 
Lankan President directly appoints the members of the 
Commission.21  The appointment of members to independent 
commissions solely by the executive thus puts the impartiality 
of their work into question.  On December 10, 2020, the Sri 
Lankan president appointed Jagath Balasuriya, a former 
Minister of National Heritage during the previous Rajapaksa 
government and a retired pro-government politician, as the 
Chairperson of the HRCSL.22  Given these developments, it is 
unlikely that this institution will be utilized in the near future 
as an avenue through which to pursue and initiate ongoing 
attempts at achieving justice for the alleged commission of 
international crimes linked to the civil war. 
2. Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) 
On May 15, 2010, the former Sri Lankan President, 
Mahinda Rajapaksa, established the LLRC.23  It concluded its 
work on November 15, 2011.24  The LLRC was not an 
investigative commission but had a limited mandate to only 
examine incidents that took place between February 21, 2002 
and May 19, 2009.25  Its mandate allowed it to look into the facts 
and circumstances that led to: the Ceasefire Agreement, which 
was operationalized on February 21, 2002; the events that 
unfolded up to May 19, 2009; the measures needed to ensure the 
recurrence of similar instances; and avenues for achieving 
 
19 See discussion infra Section 2.2. 
20 See generally Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, 2020 (L.D.-
O 7/2020) (Sri Lanka), 
https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/acts/gbills/english/6176.pdf.  
21 Id. art. 41A(1), at 4. 
22 President appoints new Chairperson, Members to Human Rights 
Commission, ISLAND ONLINE (Dec. 20, 2020), https://island.lk/president-
appoints-new-chairperson-members-to-human-rights-commission/. 
23 LLRC REP., supra note 9, at ii–vii, ¶ 1.1, at 5. 
24 See id. at viii. 
25 Id. ¶ 1.5. 
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national unity and reconciliation among all communities.26  
In 2011, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka criticized the 
mechanism, pointing out that: (i) the LLRC failed to satisfy key 
international standards of independence and impartiality; (ii) 
neither its mandate nor its work and methodology were tailored 
to investigating allegations of serious violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law or to examining the root 
causes of the ethnic conflict; (iii) its work demonstrated that it 
had not conducted genuine truth-seeking on what happened 
during the final stages of the armed conflict; (iv) it had not 
sought to systematically and impartially investigate the 
allegations of serious violations on both sides of the war; (v) it 
had not employed an approach that treats victims with full 
respect for their dignity and their suffering; and, (vi) it had not 
provided the necessary protection for witnesses even in 
circumstances of actual personal risk.27  
The LLRC’s final report, dated November 2011, was tabled 
in Parliament on December 6, 2011.28  It concluded that civilian 
safety had been afforded the highest priority by the Sri Lankan 
military while conducting their military operations.29  However, 
the report outlined several instances that warranted further 
investigations and expressed grave concern regarding 
allegations of disappearances of LTTE carders who had either 
been arrested by or surrendered to the Sri Lankan security 
forces.30  The report generated considerable debate on 
reconciliation, human rights, and governance in Sri Lanka.31  
However, the fact that it was only released in English meant 
 
26 Id. pmbl., ¶ 1.5. 
27 UNSG Experts Accountability Rep., supra note 1, ¶ 344. 
28 LLRC report tabled in Parliament, SRI LANKA HIGH COMM’N OTTAWA, 
http://www.torontoslcg.org/ottawa2/index.php?option=com_content&view=art
icle&id=185:llrc-report-tabled-in-parliament&catid=53:other-
news&Itemid=120 (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).  
29 LLRC REP., supra note 9, ¶ 4.262. 
30 See id. ¶¶ 4.104–4.111, 4.261–4.265, 4.315–4.319. 
31 See generally Statement on the Report of Sri Lanka's Lessons Learnt 
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that those Sri Lankans who were not well versed in English were 
essentially left out of these discussions.  Regardless, as outlined 
below, the LLRC’s observations led to the establishment of 
several other mechanisms, albeit with limited success, in terms 
of achieving accountability. 
3. Military Court of Inquiry (MCI) 
In 2012, the MCI, also known as the Army Court of Inquiry, 
consisting of five members (all military officers), was established 
to probe the allegations of war crimes committed by the Sri 
Lankan military.32  It was established in response to 
observations made by the LLRC related to war crimes 
allegations against the military outlined in the initial Channel 
4 documentary.33  Its establishment—so close to a meeting of the 
UN Human Rights Council in Geneva where a resolution on the 
lack of accountability for alleged violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law during the armed conflict 
was expected to be discussed—was viewed as being a delaying 
tactic by Sri Lanka to divert international attention from the 
issue of accountability.34  Its impartiality was further questioned 
by the Presidential Commission to Investigate into Complaints 
regarding Missing Persons (a.k.a. Paranagama Commission).35  
The report of the MCI was never made public; however, the 
MCI claimed that “evidence before [it] ha[d] conclusively 
established that the Humanitarian Operation [during the last 
phases of the war] was conducted strictly in accordance with the 
 
32 See LLRC Observations Cleared; Army Commander Hands Over Court 
of Inquiry Report to Secretary Defence, SRI LANKA ARMY, 
https://www.army.lk/news/llrc-observations-cleared-army-commander-hands-
over-court-inquiry-report-secretary-defence (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). This 
was established under Regulation 4 of the Courts of Inquiry Regulations of 
1952, which created the Army Court of Inquiry. Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Sri Lanka: Army Inquiry a Delaying Tactic, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 
15, 2012, 5:28 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/15/sri-lanka-army-
inquiry-delaying-tactic#. 
35 PARANAGAMA COMM’N, REPORT ON THE SECOND MANDATE OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO COMPLAINTS OF ABDUCTIONS AND 
DISAPPEARANCES ¶ 546 (2015), 
https://parliament.lk/uploads/documents/paperspresented/report-of-
paranagama.pdf [hereinafter PARANAGAMA COMM’N REP.]. 
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‘Zero Civilian Casualty’ directive made by . . . the President . . . 
and commanders . . . .”36  Its final report exonerated the military 
of any responsibility for the alleged crimes and instead laid all 
blame on the LTTE,37 leading some to claim that the military 
and government of Sri Lanka could not be trusted to investigate 
the alleged crimes committed during the final phases of the 
conflict.38 
4. Presidential Commission to Investigate into Complaints 
Regarding Missing Persons (Paranagama Commission) 
Subsequently, the Paranagama Commission was 
established by former President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, on August 
15, 2013.39  During its First Mandate, the Commission held 
public hearings in the North and East of Sri Lanka and 
considered evidence relating to approximately 2,700 complaints 
linked to missing and disappeared persons.40  Eventually, on 
July 15, 2014, the Commission’s mandate was expanded “to 
address the facts and circumstances surrounding civilian loss of 
life and the question of the responsibility of any individual, 
group or institution for violations of international law during the 
[civil war] that ended in May 2009,” also known as the Second 
Mandate.41  The Commission was tasked with inquiring into and 
reporting on several matters referred to in the report of the 
LLRC, including allegations of crimes committed by the LTTE 
and the Sri Lankan armed forces.42  Upon the election of former 
president, Maithripala Sirisena, the Commission’s First and 
 
36 Army Court of Inquiry on Channel 4 Allegations Referred to in the 
LLRC Report Submits Its Findings to the Commander of the Army, SRI LANKA 
ARMY, https://www.army.lk/news/army-court-inquiry-channel-4-allegations-
referred-llrc-report-submits-its-findings-commander (last visited Mar. 22, 
2021). 
37 See LLRC Observations Cleared; Army Commander Hands Over Court 
of Inquiry Report to Secretary Defence, supra note 32, for a synopsis of actions 
taken by the LTTE.  
38 Yasmin Sooka, The empty findings of Sri Lanka’s Military Court of 
Inquiry, GROUNDVIEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), 
https://groundviews.org/2013/04/11/the-empty-findings-of-sri-lankas-military-
court-of-inquiry/. 
39 PARANAGAMA COMM’N REP., supra note 35, ¶ 16. 
40 Id. ¶ 1. 
41 Id. ¶ 2. 
42 Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/3
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Second Mandates were once again extended until August 15, 
2015.43  Its second report was finalized in August of 2015.44  The 
Commission was disbanded on July 15, 2016.45 
The Commission found that the Channel 4 documentaries 
“provide[d] enough material to form a reasonable basis to believe 
that war crimes may have been committed, warranting an 
investigation.”46  However, it did not view this as providing 
conclusive evidence “of any overarching political or military 
directive to commit such crimes.”47  It recommended the 
establishment of a credible Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) as its preferred mechanism for ensuring 
accountability.48  Had any international crimes been committed, 
given Sri Lanka’s reluctance to submit any accused to 
international fora for trial and its reluctance to accept 
international involvement, the Commission suggested setting 
up a purely domestic tribunal (without the involvement of 
international judges) for trying the alleged perpetrators (e.g., a 
Special Division of the Supreme Court).49  In order to enable such 
prosecutions of international crimes, it further suggested that 
the government incorporate provisions on the criminalization of 
the core international crimes into domestic law.50  
5. Consultation Task Force (CTF) on Reconciliation 
Mechanisms 
Following this, in January of 2016, the CTF was established 
by the Prime Minister.51  It was a result of Sri Lanka’s pledge to 
 
43 Id. ¶ 4. 
44 See generally id.  
45 SRI LANKA: MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICES: ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE 
MECHANISMS TO DELIVER JUSTICE, TRUTH AND REPARATIONS TO VICTIMS, 
AMNESTY INT’L 30 (2016), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA3749022016ENGLISH.P
DF. 
46 PARANAGAMA COMM’N REP., supra note 35, ¶ 425. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. ¶¶ 620, 625–26. 
49 Id. ¶¶ 616–17. 
50 Id. ¶ 613. 
51 Sri Lanka: Consultation Task Force report must lead to justice, 
AMNESTY INT’L (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/sri-lanka-consultation-task-
11
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the UN Human Rights Council under Resolution 30/1, which Sri 
Lanka co-sponsored.52  It consisted of 11 members drawn from 
civil society.53  Through a consultation process with various 
segments of the Sri Lankan public, the CTF’s task was to 
ascertain the public’s views on the most appropriate 
mechanisms for transitional justice and reconciliation proposed 
in Resolution 30/1.54  The CTF’s report, finalized on November 
17, 2016, was presented to the Chairperson of the Office for 
National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR)55 in January of 
2017.56  It highlighted the findings of the community 
consultation process, including the frustration expressed by the 
public at yet another mechanism being established despite the 
failures and inconclusive nature of past initiates on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, the yearning for justice and the 
hope that this mechanism would prove to be different from the 
others.57  The report further mentioned the need for a political 
and constitutional settlement to the conflict in order to bring 
about true reconciliation.58  
Submissions made to the CTF by the government security 
forces and police highlighted their concerns that a reconciliation 
mechanism would be counterproductive, pose a threat to 
 
force-report-must-lead-to-justice/. 
52 Id.; Sri Lanka: implement Task Force recommendations to deliver 
justice for victims of human rights abuse, INT'L COMM'N JURISTS (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://www.icj.org/sri-lanka-implement-task-force-recommendations-to-
deliver-justice-for-victims-of-human-rights-abuse/.  
53 FINAL REPORT OF THE CONSULTATION TASK FORCE ON RECONCILIATION 
MECHANISMS – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ¶ 1, at 83 (2016), 
http://war-victims-map.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTF-Final-Report-
Exec-Summary-and-Recomm-Nov-16.pdf. [hereinafter CTF REP.]. 
54 See Sri Lanka: implement Task Force recommendations to deliver 
justice for victims of human rights abuse, supra note 52. 
55 For background on the implementation and purpose of the ONUR, see 
generally Implementing Agencies – Office for National Unity and 
Reconciliation, MINISTRY NAT’L INTEGRATION & RECONCILIATION, 
http://nirmin.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=41
&Itemid=205&lang=en (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).  
56 CTF on Reconciliation Mechanisms fear recommendations will not be 
used, DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:00 AM), 
https://dailynews.lk/2017/03/17/local/110736/ctf-reconciliation-mechanisms-
fear-recommendations-will-not-be-used?page=4551. 
57 CTF REP., supra note 53, ¶ 2, at 85. 
58 Id. ¶ 10, at 87.  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol33/iss2/3
2021 Justice delayed, justice denied? 231 
national security, and reignite ethnic tensions.59  All security 
sector personnel who made submissions to the CTF rejected 
international involvement in a possible future reconciliation 
mechanism, and, while unequivocal support was expressed for 
the government’s reconciliation efforts, they expressed their 
preference for a restorative, as opposed to a retributive, 
approach.60  Representatives of the Sri Lankan army supported 
a truth seeking mechanism as well as prosecutions of the guilty 
should any criminal activity be concluded to have transpired; 
however, they categorically denied that any wrongdoing or 
criminal activity had taken place and, therefore, did not see the 
need for granting amnesties.61  
The CTF recommended that effective remedies be granted 
to those who had suffered harm during the conflict, including 
through utilizing criminal justice.62  It recommended 
incorporating provisions criminalizing international crimes, 
such as war crimes and crimes against humanity, into Sri 
Lanka’s domestic law.63  The CTF’s recommendation was for a 
hybrid court, “Special Court and Office of Special Counsel,” to be 
established, comprising of a majority of national judges on the 
bench as well as a sufficient number of international judges with 
its material jurisdiction extending to prosecuting crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and violations of customary international 
law with no temporal limitations on jurisdiction.64  
Recommendations for the establishment of a “Truth, Justice, 
Reconciliation and Non-Recurrence Commission (TJRNRC)” 
were also set out.65  
However, to date, neither a “Special Court and Office of 
Special Counsel” nor a “TJRNRC” has materialized.  The law 
reform initiatives too have failed to see the light of day.  Perhaps 
 
59 Id. ¶ 3, at 85. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. ¶ 4, at 86. 
62 Id. ¶ 1.5, at 98. 
63 Id. ¶ 11, at 87. Some submissions recommended including provisions 
on modes of responsibility, which recognize superior and command 
responsibility and joint criminal enterprise as domestic law. Id. ¶ 28, at 95. 
64 Id. ¶¶ 24–25, at 94; see also id. ¶¶ 6.1–6.15, at 114–15, for the judicial 
mechanisms of the Special Court and Office of Special Counsel. 
65 Id. at 112–14.  
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this lack of action comes as no surprise given the fact that the 
CTF’s recommendations faced an uphill battle from the outset.  
Surprisingly, after the release of its final report, the Sri Lankan 
Justice Minister stated that he had “no confidence” in the CTF, 
indicating that the government had little interest in 
implementing its recommendations.66 
6. Office on Missing Persons (OMP) and Related Legislation 
The bill for establishing the OMP was presented to the Sri 
Lankan Parliament on June 22, 2016,67 while the CTF 
consultation process was still ongoing, raising doubts about the 
government’s seriousness about any eventual findings and 
recommendations by the CTF.  This fact was highlighted when 
the CTF issued an interim report on the establishment of the 
OMP.68  The OMP was established through the Office on Missing 
Persons (Establishment, Administration and Discharge of 
Functions) Act, No. 14 of 2016.69  The Act passed through the Sri 
Lankan Parliament on August 11, 2016 and was certified on 
August 23, 2016.70  Subsequently, the OMP was operationalized 
on February 28, 2018.71  Its mandate allows it to probe the 
disappearances that took place during and after the civil war.72  
This latest element in the push for accountability was 
 
66 I have no confidence in the CTF: Wijeyadasa, DAILY MIRROR (Jan. 6, 
2017, 9:01 PM), http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/I-have-no-confidence-in-the-
CTF-Wijeyadasa-121817.html. 
67 Establishment of the OMP, OFF. ON MISSING PERS., 
http://www.ompsrilanka.org/about/establishment-of-the-commission (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2021). 
68 CTF REP., supra note 53, ¶ 1, at 88; see generally CONSULTATION TASK 
FORCE ON RECONCILIATION MECHANISMS, INTERIM REPORT – THE OFFICE ON 
MISSING PERSONS BILL AND ISSUES CONCERNING THE MISSING, THE DISAPPEARED 
AND THE SURRENDERED (2016).  
69 See generally Office on Missing Persons (Establishment, 
Administration and Discharge of Functions) Act, No. 14 of 2016 (L.D.-O 
32/2016) (Sri Lanka), 
http://www.ompsrilanka.org/storage/app/uploads/public/5f4/25e/624/5f425e62
4f9b3557724334.pdf [hereinafter OMP Act]. 
70 Id.; Establishment of the OMP, supra note 67. 
71 See generally OFF. ON MISSING PERS., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2018), 
https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/documents/paperspresented/annual-
report-office-on-missing-persons-2018.pdf, for a detailed explanation of the 
OMP’s operationalization during 2018. 
72 OMP Act, supra note 69, at 6–7. 
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accompanied by the enacting of the International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances Act 
No.5 of 2018 (EDA).73  The EDA incorporates the obligations 
outlined in the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances into Sri Lankan 
domestic law.74  However, the national criminalization of 
enforced disappearances remains inadequate given that it does 
not: 
(i) include instances where some elements of 
the crime occurred prior to the enactment 
of the Act, in the definition of “enforced 
disappearances;” 
 
(ii) capture the full range of potential 
perpetrators and full scope of command 
responsibility; and 
 
(iii) recognize enforced disappearances as a 
crime against humanity. 
 
Since 2018, in addition to its head office in Colombo, the 
OMP has opened several regional offices in Jaffna, Batticaloa, 
Mannar and Matara.75  However, the mechanism has faced a 
multitude of difficulties along the way.  Victims’ rights groups 
view the OMP as being a largely watered down version of 
victims’ aspirations.76  Also, the families of the disappeared 
along with the lawyers who represent them continue to face 
 
73 See generally International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearances Act, 2018 (Act No. 5/2018) (Sri Lanka), 
https://www.srilankalaw.lk/gazette/2018_pdf/05-2018_E.pdf.   
74 See id. pmbl. 
75 Office for Missing Persons, Regional office, MINISTRY JUST. SRI LANKA, 
https://www.moj.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=154&Itemid=242&lang=en (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
76 See MCM Iqbal, The OMP and the Aspirations of Families of the 
Missing and Disappeared, GROUNDVIEWS (May 17, 2018), 
https://groundviews.org/2018/05/17/the-office-of-missing-persons-and-the-
aspirations-of-affected-families-in-sri-lanka/; Distrust as Sri Lanka sets up 
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threats both from government authorities and non-state 
actors.77  According to former OMP Chairperson, Saliya Pieris, 
one of the key challenges for the OMP included the “lack of 
cooperation from key state actors . . . .”78  The polarized national 
context within which the OMP operates, with a large segment of 
the Sri Lankan population questioning the need for addressing 
the issue of missing and disappeared persons, poses additional 
challenges.  Moreover, the recommendations outlined in the 
OMP’s interim report have seen limited progress concerning 
implementation.79  Additionally, the OMP’s Chairperson, Saliya 
Peiris resigned in September of 2020.80  Following his 
resignation, the former Chairperson of the Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry on Political Victimization, retired 
Supreme Court Justice Upali Abeyratne was appointed the 
Chairperson of the OMP on November 30, 2020.81  Some, 
including Sri Lankan human rights activists, have questioned 
 
77 Sri Lanka: Deliver justice, truth and reparation to families of the 
disappeared, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 27, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/sri-lanka-deliver-justice-
truth-and-reparation-to-families-of-the-disappeared/. 
78 OMP made progress amidst lack of cooperation from state actors & 
continuous efforts to deny the rights of families of the disappeared – Saliya 
Pieris, SRI LANKA BRIEF (Oct. 28, 2019), https://srilankabrief.org/omp-made-
progress-amidst-lack-of-cooperation-from-state-actors-continuous-efforts-to-
deny-the-rights-of-families-of-the-disappeared-saliya-pieris/. 
79 Ruki Fernando, 900 days of protests: Still searching for truth and 
justice, SUNDAY OBSERVER (Sept. 1, 2019), 
http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/09/01/opinion/900-days-protests-still-
searching-truth-and-justice. 
80 Skandha Gunasekara, OMP Chief to resign, MORNING (Aug. 25, 2020), 
http://www.themorning.lk/office-on-missing-person-chief-to-resign/; About us – 
Profiles of the Commissioners, OFF. ON MISSING PERS., 
http://www.ompsrilanka.org/about/profiles-of-the-commissioners (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2021). 
81 OFF. ON MISSING PERSONS, ANNUAL REPORT 2020 ¶ 6.16 (2020), 
http://www.ompsrilanka.org/storage/app/uploads/public/604/847/009/6048470
09edfb770550416.pdf [hereinafter OMP ANN. REP. 2020]; Hiranyada Dewasiri, 
‘The Office on Missing Persons didn’t achieve anything substantial’, MORNING 
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.themorning.lk/the-office-on-missing-persons-
didnt-achieve-anything-substantial/; AMNESTY INT’L , SRI LANKA: RESPONSE TO 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON FOLLOW UP TO RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SPECIAL 
RAPPORTEUR ON THE PROMOTION OF TRUTH, JUSTICE, REPARATION AND 
GUARANTEES OF NON-RECURRENCE 8 (2021), 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2043952/ASA3735492021ENGLISH.pdf 
[hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L RESPONSE]. 
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the new OMP Chairperson’s impartiality,82 criticized his track 
record and view him as being “a pawn of the Government.”83  Of 
late, the continued operation of the OMP has also been brought 
into question.  The remaining Commissioners of the OMP were 
to complete their mandates in February 2021.84  At the date of 
writing, it is unclear as to whether new Commissioners have 
been appointed to the OMP.  Additionally, in November 2020, 
Amnesty International expressed concern that the budget of the 
OMP may be scaled back by the Sri Lankan government.85  No 
express mention of allocation of funds for the OMP was 
mentioned in either the National Budget for 2021 or the Budget 
Speech for 2021.86  Funding has however been allocated for the 
Ministry of Justice, which acts as the OMP’s immediate line 
ministry, in the 2021 National Budget.87  With the OMP being 
the only functioning transitional justice mechanism that has 
been in operation in Sri Lanka until quite recently, these issues 
pose significant challenges for achieving justice. 
B. National Legal Action 
Generally, states are only bound by their national laws, 
treaty obligations that they have entered into, and the rules of 
customary international law.  Being a state that follows a dualist 
system, Sri Lanka is not automatically bound by international 
treaty obligations once it signs such treaties but has to 
 
82 AMNESTY INT’L RESPONSE, supra note 81 at 8; OHCHR Advanced 
Edited Rep., supra note 7, ¶ 44. 
83 Dewasiri, supra note 81. 
84 Int’l Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism, Oral 
Statement at the 46th Session of the Hum. Rts. Council: Interactive Dialogue 
on the OHCHR Report on Sri Lanka (Feb. 24, 2021); Dewasiri, supra note 81.  
85 Sri Lanka: Commit funds to support transitional justice process for 
victims of conflict, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 16, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/sri-lanka-commit-funds-to-
support-transitional-justice-process-for-victims-of-conflict/. 
86 Appropriation Act, No. 7 of 2020 (L.D.-O 11/2020) (Sri Lanka) 
https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/bills/gbills/english/6202.pdf [hereinafter 
Appropriation Act]; Hon. Mahinda Yapa Abeywardana, M.P., Honourable 
Speaker, Sri Lanka Parliament, Budget Speech 2021 (transcript available at 
https://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/budget/2021/budget-speech-
2021.pdf#page=113).  
87 OMP ANN. REP. 2020, supra note 81, ¶¶ 6.10–6.15; Appropriation Act, 
supra note 86, at 19–20. 
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subsequently enact national legislation in order for the 
international legal obligations to apply domestically.88  Sri 
Lanka signed Geneva Conventions I to IV on February 28, 1959, 
and domestically enacted the Geneva Conventions Act, No. 4 of 
2006.89  However, it has not ratified Additional Protocol II to the 
Geneva Conventions, which applies to non-international armed 
conflicts.90  At the time of writing this article, the Geneva 
Conventions Act 2006 has not yet been operationalized in Sri 
Lanka.  Even if it had been operationalized, the Act does not 
criminalize violations of Common Article 3 that apply to non-
international armed conflicts.91  Despite this, it is important to 
note that Sri Lanka continues to be bound by its obligations 
under customary international law. 
As for Sri Lanka’s penal code, it does not include any 
provisions criminalizing the commission of either of the core 
international crimes (e.g., genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, crime of aggression).92  Hence, in the absence of 
judicial reform, certain crimes that would otherwise be classified 
as a core international crime would have to be tried as a 
domestic crimes (e.g., murder, assault, etc.).93  Moreover, even 
when attempting to prosecute the alleged international crimes 
as domestic crimes utilizing the penal code offences, several 
 
88 Jeeva Niriella, An Appraisal on Some Aspects of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 21 SRI LANKA J. INT’L L. 193, 212 (2009). 
89 See Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries, Sri Lanka, INT’L COMM. 
RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_cou
ntrySelected=LK (last visited Mar. 26, 2021); Geneva Conventions Act, No. 4 
of 2006 (L.D.-O 64/2004) (Sri Lanka), 
https://www.moj.gov.lk/web/images/latest_document//2006/1480651525-a04-
geneva-convention-2006-en.pdf [hereinafter Geneva Conventions Act]. 
90 See Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, INT'L 
COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NOR
MStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=475 (last visited Mar. 23, 2021). 
91 See generally Geneva Conventions Act, supra note 89.  
92 See generally Penal Code (Ordinance No. 2 of 1883) (Sri Lanka), 
https://www.lawnet.gov.lk/penal-code-consolidated-2/, which lacks a provision 
criminalizing core international crimes.  
93 See id., for penalties for domestic crimes. 
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issues arise.  Some of these challenges stem from the lack of 
availability of senior LTTE members for prosecution, an 
apparent reluctance to prosecute senior LTTE members who 
have become allies of the Sri Lankan government, an apparent 
reluctance to prosecute senior government officials and 
members of the military, evidentiary challenges, etc. 
The senior leadership of the LTTE is believed to have been 
wiped out at the end of the civil war.94  Thus, domestic 
prosecutions of these senior LTTE members for any alleged 
crimes they may have committed during the course of the civil 
war cannot be initiated posthumously.  Selvarajah 
Pathmanathan (a.k.a. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, a.k.a. 
Kumaran Pathmanathan, a.k.a. KP), the LTTE’s diplomatic 
chief (Head of International Relations) who was in charge of the 
LTTE’s smuggling and weapon acquisitions, is believed to be the 
most senior LTTE operative still alive.95  He was said to have 
been hiding in Southeast Asia and was wanted by Interpol.96  
Reports of his capture emerged in August 2009.97  Despite 
statements by Sri Lankan government officials that he was in 
government custody98 and will be prosecuted under Sri Lankan 
law,99 he has never been prosecuted and convicted in connection 
to crimes committed during the civil war.  Reports later emerged 
in 2015 that he had fled the island.100  However, a 2020 interview 
 
94 Ranga Sirilal, Sri Lanka's Tigers acknowledge leader's death, 
REUTERS (May 29, 2009, 1:56 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
srilanka-war/sri-lankas-tigers-acknowledge-leaders-death-
idUSTRE54O0VL20090525. 
95 Id.; Manjula Fernando, Arrest of Nanthagopan: Turning point in battle 
against LTTE remnants, SUNDAY OBSERVER (Apr. 13, 2014), 
http://archives.sundayobserver.lk/2014/04/13/fea00.asp. 
96 Sirilal, supra note 94. 
97 C. Bryson Hull, Sri Lanka snares new Tamil Tiger head overseas, 




99 KP will be prosecuted under our laws, says Lankan Govt, INDIAN 
EXPRESS (Aug. 9, 2009, 2:57 AM), https://indianexpress.com/article/news-
archive/web/kp-will-be-prosecuted-under-our-laws-says-lankan-govt/.  
100 Lanka to prosecute LTTE leader wanted for Rajiv Gandhi killing, 
BUS. STANDARD (Jan. 10, 2015), https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-
stories/lanka-to-prosecute-ltte-leader-wanted-for-rajiv-gandhi-killing-
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revealed that he had been living in Kilinochchi, Sri Lanka, 
under protective custody, for the preceding 8 years.101  Other 
former LTTE members, such as the former eastern commander 
of the LTTE, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (a.k.a. Colonel 
Karuna Amman), have also never faced accountability.102  
Muralitharan defected from the LTTE in 2004, and led a 
paramilitary group, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal 
(TMVP), that is alleged to have assisted the Sri Lankan military 
in fighting the LTTE.103  It is alleged that the TMVP was 
involved in the commission of war crimes, including the 
recruitment of child soldiers.104  The TMVP formed a political 
party,105 and Muralitharan was elected as a member of the Sri 
Lankan parliament even as the civil war was still raging on.106  
In 2009, he left the TMVP to join the then ruling party, headed 
by ex-president Mahinda Rajapaksa and was appointed Sri 
Lanka’s Minister of National Reconciliation and Integration.107  
The TMVP is now led by former LTTE cadre and ex-deputy to 
Colonel Karuna Amman, Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan 
 
115011000850_1.html.  
101 Attempts to revamp LTTE futile under GR government: KP, DAILYFT 
(July 30, 2020), http://www.ft.lk/opinion/Attempts-to-revamp-LTTE-futile-
under-GR-government-KP/14-703851. 
102 Bhavani Fonseka, The long wait for justice, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN (Aug. 
7, 2020), https://www.himalmag.com/the-long-wait-for-justice-srilanka-2020/. 
103 Id. 
104 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & BINA D’COSTA, CASCADES OF VIOLENCE: WAR, 
CRIME AND PEACEBUILDING ACROSS SOUTH ASIA 371 (2018); Sri Lanka: Probe 
into LTTE Crimes Should Start with Karuna, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 28, 
2013, 5:45 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/28/sri-lanka-probe-ltte-
crimes-should-start-karuna. 
105 See Immigration & Refugee Bd. of Can., Sri Lanka: The Tamil 
Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and Karuna factions; their relationship 
with each other; reports concerning their treatment of Sinhalese and Tamil 
citizens; whether they are still active as paramilitary groups, REFWORLD (Feb. 
17, 2002), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f4f35d22.html, for details regarding 
the establishment of TMVP's political party. 
106 Ajith Jayasinghe, Breakaway Tiger leader sworn into Sri Lanka 
parliament, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2008, 3:15 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-35834420081007. 
107 Ex-LTTE commander appointed Minister for National Integration, 
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(a.k.a. Pillayan),108 who too has evaded the long arm of the law. 
There have been some instances where LTTE members, who 
sat lower down in the organizational hierarchy, have been tried 
by domestic Sri Lankan courts for their alleged involvement in 
the commission of crimes related to the civil war.  For instance, 
on January 10, 2019, “the North Central Provincial High Court 
sentenced two former LTTE members to 185 years’ rigorous 
imprisonment for shooting down a Sri Lankan Air Force plane 
in March 2000, which killed 37 [individuals].”109  Subsequently, 
on January 23, 2019, “the Anuradhapura High Court sentenced 
two former LTTE members to 25 years’ rigorous imprisonment 
for the murder of eight people, including an Army officer, in 
2007.”110  
The Report of the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Investigation on Sri 
Lanka (OISL Report) states that in Sri Lanka “[c]hallenges in 
delivering judicial accountability . . . [are] exacerbated when the 
suspects belong to the security forces.”111  Domestic prosecutions 
of military personnel for the alleged commission of crimes during 
and/or connected to the civil war, have been rare.  Convictions 
in such cases have been rarer still.112  One such instance includes 
the acquittal on July 27, 2016, of six former army corporals 
charged with the killing of 24 civilians in the village of 
Kumarapuram—known as the Kumarapuram massacre 
committed on February 11, 1996—where a jury trial delivered a 
not guilty verdict.113  Moreover, the abovementioned 
 
108 Sri Lanka: Collapse of Joseph Pararajasingham murder case a failure 
of justice, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan. 13, 2021), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/01/sri-lanka-collapse-of-joseph-
pararajasingham-murder-case-a-failure-of-justice/; Lanka court acquits child 
soldier-turned-lawmaker in ethnic Tamil leader’s murder case, TRIBUNE INDIA 
(Apr. 11, 2021), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/lanka-court-
acquits-child-soldier-turned-lawmaker-in-ethnic-tamil-leaders-murder-case-
197924. 
109 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2019: Sri Lanka (2019).  
110 Id.  
111 OISL Rep., supra note 3, ¶ 1233. 
112 Id. ¶ 1224 (“It was a very rare case in which a member of the security 
forces was convicted for a grave human rights violation . . . .”). 
113 See Justice undone – Kumarapuram massacre case, CTR. FOR HUM. 
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Trincomalee Five Case witnessed years of toing and froing.  
Specifically, in 2006, 12 police Special Task Force (STF) 
members were arrested in connection with the killing of five 
Tamil Students in Trincomalee, but were later released due to 
lack of evidence.114  Subsequently, in July of 2013, they were 
rearrested but released three months later because no criminal 
proceedings were initiated against them.115  Most recently, on 
July 3, 2019, the Trincomalee Chief Magistrate acquitted 13 
defendants, including 12 STF members, due to lack of 
evidence.116  The defendants were charged under Section 296 of 
the Penal Code for committing murder of five individuals and 
under Section 300 of the Penal Code, read with section 32, for 
the attempted murder of three others.117 
However, in a rare occurrence in June of 2015, the Colombo 
High Court sentenced Army Sergeant, Sunil Rathnayake, to 
death for his participation in a massacre in Mirusuvil (near 
Jaffna) in December of 2000 of eight Tamil IDPs, which included 
children (an event that occurred after the end of the civil war).118  
Four other accused soldiers were acquitted due to insufficient 
evidence.119  The conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court 
 
RTS. & DEV., https://srilankachrd.org/la-kumarapuram.php (last visited Mar. 
25, 2021), which discusses the Kumarapuram massacre case (HCEP/1959/02—
HC/133/08). 
114 Sri Lanka: No Justice for ‘Trinco 5’, supra note 14. For a summary of 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case, see CTR. FOR POL’Y ALT., THE 
NEED FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN SRI LANKA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GLANCE 
AT SEVEN EMBLEMATIC CASES 16–21 (2019), https://www.cpalanka.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/FINAL-A-Glance-at-Seven-Emblematic-cases-.pdf.  
115 Easwaran Rutnam, Trinco 5 massacre: A father’s cry for justice, 
MORNING (Jan. 14, 2019), http://www.themorning.lk/pg6lead-2/. 
116 Sri Lanka: No Justice for ‘Trinco 5’, supra note 14. 
117 A.T.M. Gunananda, STF men acquitted in Trinco students murder 
case, DAILY NEWS (July 4, 2019), http://www.dailynews.lk/2019/07/04/law-
order/190200/stf-men-acquitted-trinco-students-murder-case. 
118 See Army Sergeant found guilty and sentenced in the Mirusuvil 
massacre case, CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & DEV., https://srilankachrd.org/la-
mirusuvil.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2021), for a discussion on the Mirusuvil 
massacre case (HC/1092/2002).  
119 Veluppillai Thangavelu, International Community Should Enforce 
Universal Jurisdiction Clause Against Sri Lankan Officials, COLUMBO 
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of Sri Lanka—the country’s highest judicial body—in April of 
2019.120  This sentence was viewed as a rare case, exhibiting how 
Sri Lanka’s domestic legal system and its courts are, in fact, 
capable of conducting investigations and rendering convictions 
for grave human rights violations.121  However, in a widely 
condemned move, the current Sri Lankan President issued a 
presidential pardon to Mr. Rathnayake in March of 2020, which 
did not come as a surprise.122  While campaigning for the 
presidency in 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa claimed that “[a] large 
number of war heroes are in jails on trumped up charges” and 
that “[he’d] like to say . . . all of them would be acquitted and 
freed.”123  Unfortunately, he appears to be delivering on this 
promise. 
Numerous habeas corpus (writ) applications, which are civil 
suits brought by relatives and loved ones of victims, have also 
been filed at domestic courts.124  Some of these have been filed 
by the families of those who disappeared during the final stages 
of the war while attempting to cross from the battle zone to the 
government declared “no fire zone,” and the families of those 
who surrendered to the Sri Lankan Army whose whereabouts 
are still unknown.125  The petitioning families have cited the 
Commander of the Sri Lankan Army and the General Officer 
Commanding in Mullaithivu of the Sri Lankan Army as 
 
120 Rathnayake Mudiyanselage Sunil Ratnayake v. Hon. Attorney 
General, SC. Appeal No. 19/2003, at 24 (Apr. 25, 2019) (Sri Lanka), 
http://www.supremecourt.lk/images/documents/sc_tab_1_2016.pdf.  
121 OISL Rep., supra note 3, ¶ 1224. 
122 Mirusuvil Massacre – Accused Pardoned; No Reparations for Victims’ 
Families, CTR. FOR POL’Y ALT. (Mar. 30, 2020), 
https://www.cpalanka.org/mirusuvil-massacre-accused-pardoned-no-
reparations-for-victims-families/. For further commentary on public concern 
surrounding the pardon, see Justice reversed for victims of the Mirusuvil 
massacre, Sri Lanka, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/03/justice-reversed-for-victims-
of-the-mirusuvil-massacre-from-sri-lanka/. 
123 Tisaranee Gunasekara, Asking the Future, GROUNDVIEWS (Oct. 20, 
2019), https://groundviews.org/2019/10/20/asking-the-future/. 
124 See Journey towards truth seeking – Habeas Corpus (writ) 
applications, CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & DEV., https://srilankachrd.org/la-writ.php 
(last visited Mar. 24, 2021). 
125 Id.  
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respondents in several of their applications.126  The progress of 
these cases has been slow and there have been numerous 
delays.127 
III. INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS 
Though some governments and international organizations 
condemned the events occurring during the last phase of the civil 
war in Sri Lanka, strong, decisive action was lacking.128  In May 
of 2009, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) expressed 
its concern regarding the humanitarian crisis in northeast Sri 
Lanka, calling for urgent action by all parties to the conflict to 
ensure the safety of civilians.129  During a visit to Sri Lanka in 
March of 2009, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) 
recommended establishing an accountability process for any 
international crimes allegedly committed during the conflict, 
and the Sri Lankan government appeared to agree.130  However, 
faced with a lack of concrete action, a year after the end of the 
civil war, on June 22, 2010, the UNSG appointed a Panel of 
Experts to advise him on the implementation of this joint 
commitment.131  The Panel’s report, dated March 31, 2011, 
concluded that serious violations attributable to both sides of the 
conflict had taken place, some of which amounted to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, warranting accountability under 
domestic and international law.132  It recommended establishing 
an international mechanism to carry out independent 
investigations into the alleged violations, whilst also monitoring 
and assessing the extent to which the government was carrying 
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previous commitments, “[t]he report received a cold reception 
from the Sri Lankan government.”134 
However, calls for setting up a legal mechanism for trying 
the alleged perpetrators of wartime atrocities continued.  In 
2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron urged the Sri Lankan 
government to hold an independent international inquiry into 
the alleged commission of war crimes, setting the deadline of 
March 2014 by which to take action.135  March 2014 came and 
went.  The UK government initiated no further action except for 
voting in favor of the UNHRC Resolution 25/1, “Promoting 
reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka.”136  
The Resolution, passed in March of 2014, requested the OHCHR 
to undertake a comprehensive investigation into alleged 
international crimes and serious violations of human rights 
perpetrated by both parties to the conflict in Sri 
Lanka.137  Moreover, it urged the Sri Lankan government “to 
conduct an independent and credible investigation into 
allegations of violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law . . . [and] to hold accountable 
those responsible . . . .”138 
Subsequently, in September of 2015, the OISL Report was 
released.139  The report presented findings of a comprehensive 
investigation carried out into alleged serious abuses and 
violations of human rights in Sri-Lanka by both parties to the 
civil war during the period covered by the LLRC.140  It outlined 
several instances where violations of Common Article 3 to the 
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four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and international 
humanitarian law had occurred, amounting to war crimes 
and/or crimes against humanity, such as abductions and forced 
recruitment,141 unlawful killings,142  torture,143 sexual and 
gender based violence,144 hostilities on civilians and civilian 
objects,145 control of movement,146 and denial of humanitarian 
assistance,147 among others.  It also recommended the 
establishment of “truth-seeking mechanisms, investigations, 
prosecutions . . . and measures to prevent the recurrence of . . . 
abuses.”148  It further suggested that in order to combat 
impunity, acts amounting to international crimes should be 
tried as such and not as regular national penal code offences.149  
To accomplish this, establishing a hybrid accountability 
mechanism with “international judges, prosecutors, lawyers and 
investigators” was recommended.150  “The rationale was to 
provide legitimacy to and instill confidence in the process [when 
such a hybrid mechanism is established], particularly among 
victims who doubted the impartiality of any [purely domestic] 
process given the ‘politicisation and highly polarised 
environment in Sri Lanka.’”151 
Less than a month afterwards, on October 1, 2015, a further 
resolution by the UNHRC, Resolution 30/1, again echoed the 
findings of the OISL report.152  On September 11, 2017, the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Human Rights called on Sri Lanka “to 
act on its commitment in Resolution 30/1 to establish 
transitional justice mechanisms, and to establish a clear 
timeline and benchmarks for [its] implementation . . . .”153  He 
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further urged the country to treat its obligations not as a mere 
“box-ticking exercise to placate the Council, but as an essential 
undertaking to address the rights of all its people.”154  Recently, 
the Report of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2020) once again called upon 
the Sri Lankan government to implement the measures outlined 
in Resolution 30/1.155  Despite these calls, limited action has 
materialized in the pursuit of achieving true justice and 
accountability either at the domestic level in Sri Lanka or at the 
international level. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL, OR PARTIALLY INTERNATIONAL, AVENUES 
FOR JUSTICE 
A. International Criminal Court 
Sri Lanka is not a State Party to the constitutive instrument 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC)—the Rome Statute.156  
Hence, it is not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.  However, 
there are two avenues through which any alleged commission of 
the core international crimes in Sri Lanka can be investigated 
by the ICC.  The first is through a self-referral pursuant to 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, whereby Sri Lanka lodges a 
declaration with the ICC’s registrar, accepting the Court's 
jurisdiction with regard to such crimes either conditionally for a 
particular set of crimes, for a particular period of time, or 
unconditionally.157  The second is through a UNSC referral of the 
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situation to the Court.158  The chances of either of these taking 
place are highly unlikely.  
The UNSC previously referred the situation in Libya and 
that of Darfur (Sudan) to the ICC, despite both countries being 
non-State Parties to the Rome Statute.159  In May of 2009, the 
UNSC expressed concern regarding the humanitarian crisis in 
north-east Sri Lanka.160  However, despite the alleged 
international crimes committed in Sri Lanka considered as 
being on par with those committed in Libya and Darfur 
(Sudan),161 the situation has failed to attract similar levels of 
international attention.  Moreover, the chances of a UNSC 
referral of the situation in Sri Lanka to the ICC remain bleak 
due to the country’s links to powerful nations such as Russia162 
and China.163  During a January 2020 diplomatic visit to Sri 
Lanka, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, assured 
President Gotabaya Rajapaksa of China’s continued friendship 
with Sri Lanka, and stated that “China will not allow any 
outside influences to interfere with matters that are essentially 
internal concerns of Sri Lanka.”164  During the previous 
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Mahinda Rajapaksa government, China was also one of Sri 
Lanka’s greatest allies at the UNHRC, who lobbied to defend Sri 
Lanka against war crimes allegations.165  Economic ties between 
the three countries have continued to flourish, and with China 
and Russia as permanent UNSC member states, they are very 
likely to veto any potential referral of the situation to the ICC.166 
The usual practice of the ICC is to prosecute high-level 
perpetrators, leaving the prosecuting of low-level perpetrators to 
the national level.  Even if the situation is referred to the ICC, 
and a preliminary examination and potential investigation lead 
to prosecutions stemming from the situation in Sri Lanka, as 
outlined above, it is doubtful how many senior LTTE leaders are 
still alive to face prosecution, with the exception of Selvarajah 
Pathmanathan, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, and 
Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan.  The former LTTE leader, 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, was killed during the last phases of the 
war167 along with several other senior LTTE members, including 
intelligence head, Pottu Amman, and Sea Tiger leader, 
Soosai.168  The OISL Report further outlined reasonable grounds 
for believing that additional senior members of the LTTE, such 
as the Head of LTTE Peace Secretariat, Seevaratnam 
Puleedevan, the Head of the LTTE Political Wing, Balasingham 
Nadesan,169 and the LTTE Commander, Thambirasa 
Thurairajasingham, alias Col. Ramesh,170 either surrendered to 
or were captured by the Sri Lankan armed forces during the 
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final stage of the civil war.171  The OISL Report further outlined 
that these LTTE members were believed to have been  
extrajudicially executed by the security forces, actions that 
potentially amount to war crimes.172  Hence, even if any 
prosecutions were initiated at the ICC, it is likely that the 
majority of those appearing in front of the Court would be high-
raking Sri Lankan government and military officials from the 
civil war era.  
Doubts have been raised in the past as to whether the ICC 
would be able to prosecute sitting heads of state.  However, the 
ICC’s Appeals Chamber (AC) found in the Jordan Referral re Al-
Bashir Appeal judgment that “neither State practice nor opinio 
juris . . . support[s] the existence of Head of State immunity 
under customary international law vis-à-vis an international 
court.”173  This was further held to be relevant “for the horizontal 
relationship between States when a State is requested by an 
international court to arrest and surrender the Head of State of 
another State.”174  Hence, either following a self-referral or a 
UNSC referral, the ICC’s Prosecutor should be able to initiate 
prosecutions against a current Sri Lankan Head of State for 
their alleged involvement in the commission of core 
international crimes connected to the civil war, and if requested 
by the ICC, a third state would be able to arrest the Head of 
State in question and surrender them into the custody of the 
Court.  However, it is unclear whether the AC’s conclusion was 
based on the fact that the situation in Darfur (Sudan) was 
referred to the ICC by the UNSC and, if so, whether the Court 
would only be able to prosecute a current Head of State if the 
situation is referred to the Court by the UNSC. 
B. Hybrid Court 
As mentioned previously, the option of establishing a hybrid 
court in order to prosecute the alleged international crimes 
committed during the civil war and in its aftermath has been 
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presented by various international and domestic bodies.  Such a 
mechanism usually entails both national and international 
aspects, including mixed jurisdictional aspects and a mixed 
composition of the bench.  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Kosovo 
Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, and the 
Special Panels and Serious Crimes Unit in East-Timor are all 
examples of present and former hybrid mechanisms established 
to address individual criminal responsibility for the alleged 
commission of international crimes.  
The establishment of such a mechanism requires the 
cooperation of the Sri Lankan government.  While the country 
previously appeared to be amenable to such a suggestion,175  
successive governments have repeatedly sought extra time for 
initiating national prosecutorial action against the alleged 
perpetrators.  In February 2017, Sri Lanka reiterated that the 
country needed more time in order to fulfill its promise to the 
UN Human Rights Council to investigate war crimes allegations 
stemming from the civil war.176  The former Prime Minister 
ruled out the possibility of a hybrid court for prosecuting the 
alleged crimes, stating that it was not politically feasible and 
instead proposed the establishment of a truth and reconciliation 
commission.177  Given this lack of political will from Sri Lanka, 
receiving justice for the alleged international crimes committed 
during the civil war through a hybrid prosecutorial mechanism 
would be an uphill struggle.  
C. Extraterritorial Prosecutions 
In September of 2017, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights advocated for the use of universal jurisdiction 
 
175 See H.R.C. Res. 30/1, supra note 152, ¶ 6. 
176 Rasika Jayakody, Government making progress on reconciliation 
mechanisms, SUNDAY OBSERVER (Mar. 5, 2017), 
http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2017/03/05/columns/government-making-
progress-reconciliation-mechanisms; Sri Lanka to Ask UN for More Time to 
Probe War Crimes, VOICE AMERICA (Feb. 8, 2017, 7:44 PM), 
https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/sri-lanka-ask-un-more-time-probe-
war-crimes. 
177 Jayakody, supra note 176. 
31
250 PACE INT’L L. REV. Vol. 33.2 
due to “[t]he absence of credible action in Sri Lanka to ensure 
accountability for alleged violations of international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law . . . .”178  More 
recently, in January and February 2021, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights once against highlighted that 
UN “[m]ember States can actively pursue investigations and 
prosecutions of international crimes committed by all parties in 
Sri Lanka before their own national courts, including under 
accepted principles of extraterritorial or universal jurisdiction” 
in order “to advance criminal accountability and provide 
measures of redress for victims”.179 Universal jurisdiction arises 
from the notion that every state has an interest in and a 
responsibility to bring to justice perpetrators of the gravest 
international crimes.  However, numerous previous failed 
attempts indicate that the exercise of universal jurisdiction to 
bring perpetrators of alleged international crimes to justice is no 
easy task.  For instance, in 2012, a United States court rejected a 
lawsuit against the then Sri Lankan President, Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, reasoning that, as a foreign Head of State, he 
enjoyed immunity from prosecution.180  Similarly, in late 2010, 
an attempt at seeking an arrest warrant against Mr. Rajapaksa 
and senior members of his entourage during a visit to the UK 
came to naught.181  In October of 2011, a similar arrest 
attempt was made during his visit to Australia for the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting by a Sri Lankan 
born Australian citizen, Arunachalam Jegatheeswaran, at the 
Melbourne Magistrates Court.182  Specifically, “Jegatheeswaran 
alleged that Rajapaksa had deliberately targeted civilians and 
civilian infrastructure . . . in 2007 and 2008[, which] . . . 
amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity.”183  
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However, within one day of this indictment being filed, the 
Australian Attorney-General intervened, stating that the case 
could not proceed due to Mr. Rajapaksa’s Head of State 
immunity.184 
Instances such as (i) the prosecution of former Chilean 
leader, General Pinochet,185 and (ii) the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium),186 both involved attempts to apply universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals using a second state’s 
domestic legal system.  With regard to the latter instance, the 
ICJ found no exception under customary international law that 
revokes the immunity from criminal jurisdiction granted to 
incumbent government ministers who are alleged to have 
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.187  However, 
this personal immunity appears to terminate at the cessation of 
the state official’s official duties; thus, exposing them to a real 
possibility of prosecution.  Still, wishing to avoid a diplomatic 
minefield, the chances of a second state arresting and 
prosecuting senior Sri Lankan government officials who are 
alleged to have committed international crimes once their term 
in office ends through exercising universal jurisdiction, remains 
slim. 
Since the end of the civil war, Sri Lanka appointed several 
decorated “war heroes” who played key roles in the civil war 
against the LTTE to key diplomatic positions.188  In January of 
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2011, the European Center for Constitutional and Human 
Rights (ECCHR) presented a dossier to the German Federal 
Foreign Office, outlining allegations of war crimes committed by 
the former Major General of the 57th division of the Sri Lankan 
Army, Jagath Dias.189  During that time, Mr. Dias was the 
Deputy Ambassador of Sri Lanka to Switzerland, the Holy See, 
and Germany.190  Subsequently, in April of 2011, the dossier was 
further submitted—in cooperation with the Society for 
Threatened Peoples and TRIAL International—to the Vatican 
and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.191  On each 
occasion, the ECCHR and its partner organizations called for the 
withdrawal of Mr. Dias’s diplomatic visa as well as for him to be 
declared  persona non grata.192  Eventually, following a criminal 
claim filed with the Office of the Attorney General of 
Switzerland on August 4, 2011,193 Mr. Dias was dismissed from 
his post.194  While the case against him has since been closed, 
the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland has indicated 
that should he re-enter Swiss territory, it would open an 
investigation into the allegations of suspected war crimes 
against him.195 
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In August of 2017, the International Truth and Justice 
Project filed lawsuits in Brazil and Colombia against former Sri 
Lankan Military General, Jagath Jayasuriya, who is said to 
have been in charge of government troops in the northeast of the 
country who allegedly attacked hospitals and killed masses of 
civilians during the final stages of the war.196  Following the end 
of the war, Jayasuriya was appointed as Sri Lanka’s ambassador 
to Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Surinam.197  
Because of this, he enjoyed diplomatic immunity, which 
prevented his arrest as long as he was still attached to his 
post.198  Jayasuriya later fled from Brazil back to Sri-Lanka and 
no longer holds a diplomatic position.199  Hence, should either 
Brazil or Colombia exercise universal jurisdiction for trying 
international crimes and issue an arrest warrant against 
Jayasuriya, this could result in him being put on an Interpol red 
list.  If this were to happen, as Jayasuriya is no longer covered 
by diplomatic immunity, he risks being arrested and extradited 
to the warrant issuing state to stand trial if he were to travel 
outside of Sri Lanka. 
As it is apparent from the above discussions, functional and 
diplomatic immunity200 acted as an obstacle in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by other states in bringing Sri Lankans 
who are alleged to have committed international crimes, to 
justice.  Under Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations (1961), diplomats enjoy immunity from the 
criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving 
state with some limited exceptions.201  The wording of Article 
31.1 suggests that the immunity from the criminal jurisdiction 
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of a receiving state is absolute and the only sanction at the 
disposal of a receiving state would be to utilize Article 9 of the 
Convention and declare the diplomat persona non grata.202  This 
would leave the sending state with two options, namely: (i) recall 
its diplomatic agent; or (ii) terminate the diplomatic agent’s 
functions with regard to that particular mission.203  However, 
while diplomatic immunity precludes a diplomatic agent from 
personal liability from legal action, it is not a personal right that 
is directly attached to the diplomatic agent.204  Instead, the right 
is only tied to the sending state.205  Therefore, should a receiving 
state wish to prosecute a Sri Lankan diplomatic agent in relation 
to alleged international crimes, it can request that Sri Lanka, as 
the sending state, waive the diplomatic immunity of its agent.  
However, assuming that such a request is made, it is highly 
unlikely that Sri Lanka would agree to waiving the diplomatic 
immunity of its agent. 
As for LTTE members, in 2011, the District Court of The 
Hague in the Netherlands delivered its judgment pertaining to 
five members of the LTTE in Prosecutor v. Ramalingam based 
on the exercise of universal jurisdiction.206  The defendant and 
four others were naturalized Dutch citizens.207  They were 
charged by the Public Prosecutor with membership of the LTTE 
and funding its activities from The Netherlands.208  The charges 
included participation in an organization whose object is 
committing crimes against humanity, war crimes, and criminal 
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offenses under domestic law.209  In rendering its judgment, the 
Court utilized the national laws of the Netherlands and 
international law.210  The defendant was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment for involvement in a criminal organization, but 
because the conflict in Sri Lanka was found to be a non-
international armed conflict not involving the Netherlands, the 
Court did not address the alleged crimes committed by the 
LTTE.211  In 2015, the Court of Appeal convicted the five 
individuals for participation in a criminal organization with the 
intent to commit terrorist offences, as well as participation in 
and leading of an organization with the intent to commit 
crimes.212  In 2017, the Supreme Court followed the decision of 
the Court of Appeal and confirmed the conviction.213 
Some of the victims of the alleged international crimes 
linked to the Sri Lankan civil war and its aftermath have also 
attempted to initiate civil claims against the perpetrators in 
foreign jurisdictions.  Such an attempt was made by some Tamil 
victims of the civil war when they sought to bring the former Sri 
Lankan Army General, Shavendra Silva, to justice for his 
alleged involvement in the extrajudicial killings and torture of 
LTTE members that took place during the final stages of the war 
while he led the 58th Division of the Sri Lankan Army.214  The 
lawsuit was brought under the Alien Torts Claims Act, which 
allows civil actions to be filed against someone for conduct that 
took place outside of the USA, and the Torture Victims Protection 
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Act.215  This attempt was thwarted in February of 2012 however, 
because at the time when the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York was making its decision on whether to 
address the merits of the case against Mr. Silva, he was Sri 
Lanka’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN in New 
York.216  Therefore, the District Court dismissed the lawsuit 
because Mr. Silva’s diplomatic immunity precluded the court 
from addressing the merits of the case.217  However, in an 
interview with the BBC Sinhala Service, Mr. Silva stated that 
he would not be a diplomat for life and would “be happy to defend 
the conduct of the forces at any court at any time.”218  Despite 
the allegations levied against him, in a widely criticized move, 
the Sri Lankan president appointed him the Commander of the 
Sri Lankan Army in August of 2019.219  Subsequently, in 
February of 2020, the US Secretary of State declared the 
imposition of US sanctions on Mr. Silva, who at the time was 
acting both as Sri Lanka’s Acting Chief of Defense Staff and the 
Commander of the Sri Lanka Army.220  As a result, Mr. Silva is 
now deemed a person who is:  
[R]equired under Section 7031(c) of the Department of 
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
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Appropriations Act, due to credible information of his 
involvement, through command responsibility, in gross 
violations of human rights, namely extrajudicial 
killings, by the 58th Division of the Sri Lanka Army 
during the final phase of Sri Lanka’s Civil War in 
2009.221   
Thus, Mr. Silva and his immediate family members are 
currently ineligible for entry into the United States.222  
In 2019, Sri Lanka’s former controversial wartime Defense 
Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was elected as the country’s 
new president.223  Due to his naturalized US citizenship, some 
raised the possibility of him being prosecuted in the US for his 
alleged involvement in the commission of international crimes 
during Sri Lanka’s civil war prior to his election.224  The 
possibility of prosecution existed under the War Crimes Act 
1996, which enables the prosecution of alleged war crimes 
committed abroad if the alleged perpetrator or victim is a US 
citizen or a member of the US armed forces.225  It would have 
involved the exercise of US federal jurisdiction, but is subject to 
prior approval by the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) of the 
Criminal Division or their designee.226  It is doubtful, however, 
if this option for prosecution would still be available to US 
federal prosecutors given that, in 2020, the US Treasury 
Department’s notice of persons who have renounced their US 
citizenship included Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s name.227  
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Additionally, in 2019, multiple lawsuits were filed against 
Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the US, some of which are linked to his 
former role as the country’s wartime Defense Secretary.228  Some 
of these cases are still ongoing.229  However, now that he has 
been elected president, should he be summoned to appear in 
court, he would most likely claim head of state immunity from 
such foreign prosecutorial action.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The road to achieving accountability for the alleged 
international crimes committed in connection with Sri Lanka’s 
civil war has been both long and painful; especially, for victims 
and their loved ones.  The international community appears to 
have lost interest in the conflict and the search for justice.  
Domestically, in Sri Lanka, given the lack of progress for 
initiating investigations and prosecutions and establishing a 
robust transitional justice mechanism, the options for justice 
and accountability that are available to the affected citizens are 
limited.  Events that have transpired over the past 11 years in 
the country also indicate a lack of political will to see justice 
served.  On February 26, 2020, the Sri Lankan government 
announced its withdrawal of support for Human Rights Council 
(HRC) Resolution 40/1, which incorporates the preceding 
Resolutions 30/1 and 34/1; essentially, withdrawing from its 
commitment to establish a domestic accountability mechanism 
that would probe the alleged international crimes committed 
during the civil war.230  Additionally, following Gotabaya 
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Rajapaksa’s election as the new Sri Lankan president in 2020, 
his brother, the former president of Sri Lanka, who acted as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the government armed forces and 
allegedly committed international crimes during the final stages 
of the war, now acts as the country’s Prime Minister.231  Because 
those who allegedly bear responsibility for the commission of 
international crimes occupy the most senior positions within the 
government of Sri Lanka, the chances of establishing a credible 
accountability mechanism that will investigate and prosecute 
any alleged international crimes committed during the civil war 
appear to be slim. 
Impunity, however, should not be allowed to rule the day.  
If Sri Lanka is to achieve true reconciliation following the civil 
war, it is important that it establishes mechanisms for creating 
a complete record of how and why certain events transpired 
during and after the conflict and deliver justice through 
investigating and prosecuting those responsible for the 
international crimes that are alleged to have been committed in 
connection with the war.  For this purpose, Sri Lanka should 
introduce an impartial truth and reconciliation commission with 
the purpose of establishing a thorough record of events 
pertaining to the conflict and its aftermath.  Simultaneously, it 
should open investigations into the allegations of international 
crimes with the view of prosecuting those who bear 
responsibility.  A hybrid mechanism that involves both Sri 
Lankan and international judges and legal personnel would be 
most apt for this task, especially if it is to be viewed by victims 
as a true attempt at achieving justice and reconciliation, while 
concomitantly assuaging the fears held by some segments of the 
Sri Lankan population of undue foreign influence in the 
country’s affairs.  Given the ongoing distrust and 
disappointment that has been generated due to the lack of action 
and the slow progress by former and current domestic 
mechanisms, a hybrid mechanism might be received more 
favorably by the victim populations as a more impartial option.  
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Domestic legal reforms should also be initiated where provisions 
pertaining to the criminalization of the core international crimes 
and modes of liability—especially, with regard to command and 
superior responsibility—are introduced into domestic law.  
Without such action, the delay in delivering justice for alleged 
international crimes committed during the civil war and its 
aftermath, is slowly cementing itself as a denial of justice, 
particularly with regard to victims. 
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